Carnio, Henrique Garbellini2025-12-092025-12-092025BORSATO, Fábio Vinícius Gorni. A deferência judicial no controle da atividade regulatória. Goiânia (GO), 2025. 111 f. Dissertação (Mestrado Profissional em Direito Constitucional Econômico) - Centro Universitário Alves Faria, 2025.http://repositorio.unialfa.com.br/handle/123456789/685The economic order established in the Federal Constitution of 1988 is based on the balancing of essential values such as social justice and free enterprise, and subsequent reforms introduced in the constitutional text, which created regulatory agencies and structured the regulatory power, define the legal framework of State intervention in the economic order, shaping the role of economic agents and of the recipients of the service. The regulatory activity of the economy goes through continuous improvement, aiming at the compliance of those regulated. This requires the adoption of new regulatory models, prioritizing the participation of the very subjects of regulation, reflecting the exercise of democracy in the economic sphere. With the consolidation of the structures of the legal-administrative regime under the democratic rule of law, one observes the incorporation of the premises of pragmatism in the transition from the State’s administrative supremacy toward the promotion of the fundamental rights of citizens. In view of the fundamental right to access to justice, it is common for questions concerning regulation to be submitted to the inspection of the Judiciary. In the judicial review of regulatory activity, the use of abstract fundamentals and the disregard for the expertise of other institutions constitute a negative factor in the economic and social dynamics. The lack of specific technical knowledge on the part of the judicial body increases the likelihood of error, and the replacement of the regulator’s decision by a judicial order based on abstract grounds undermines the relations among institutions. Decision making arguments based on minimalism, judicial self-restraint, and the theory of institutional capacities are relevant to the adoption of a judicial stance in cases involving the review of regulatory activity. Such arguments call for caution on the part of the Judiciary when replacing the regulator’s will in pursuit of abstract goals, such as the public interest. Judicial deference does not represent a negative attitude toward the judicial review of regulatory activity, but an invitation to investigate the quality of regulation so that it contributes to the compliance of its addressees.ptDeferência judicialIntervenção estatalConstituição Federal de 1988